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tion of law; his duties were occasional and temporary, pre-
scribed by hs "superior, the President of the United States. As
was said .by Chief Justice MARSHALL in Little et al. v.
Barrieme et al., the instructions to Mr. Blount cannot change
the nature of the transaction or, legalize any act which, with-
out those instructions, would have been a plain trespass. Mr.
Blount acted at his peril. As well might Strafford have pleaded
the King's writ as Mr. Blount might plead the President's
commission. Neither Charles Stuart nor Grover Cleveland
can be above the law.
From the language of the Constitution of the United States,
from the language of the Acts of Congress, from the language
of the Supreme Court, from precedents, from the nature of
American institutions, it can oiily be concluded that the
President of the United States has no power to appoint a
paramount diplomatic agent except by anat with the advice and
consent of the Senate.
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CONSIDERED AS EVIDENCE.
By- Wm. A. MCNEII.L, ]Esq.
The decision of the coroner, excluding Col. Ainsworth and
his counsel from the deliberations of the jury, impanelled to
inquire into the causes of the late disaster at Ford's Theatre,
has been the occasion of comment and discussion, not only
witlin legal circles, but also among those who have viewed
the situation from the standpoint of a layman. With all due
deference to the magistrate who has made this rulinig, we beg
leave to enter our respectful protest against his decision, and
in so doing, may unintentionally, though not unwillingly,
accede. a greater importance to the coroner's office than the
Washington official has ever claimed. Upon a thorough
investigation of the subject of the coroner's office, we have
concluded:
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I st. That a coroner holding an inquisition su.er visun cor-
poris is a court of record.
2d. His inquest is in the nature of a proceeding in rem, and
is prima facie evidence of all facts found therein, and in a
.ivil case throws the burden of proof on the party alleging the
con rayy.
3 d. All depositions or testimony tak6z before the coroner's
inquisition, whether reduced to writing or not-is evidence for or
against any one wbo mu!ay be thereby affected.
I. THE CORONER'S COURT IS A COURT OF RECORD.
We are impressed with the importance of this office when-
ever it is mentioned by the old common law writers. Coke.
(Institutes 8 i) calls him the vita republice pax. The same
authority (2 Institutes and 4 Institutes) informs us that: "He
was so called because he hath to do principally with the pleas
of the crown, or such wherein the king is more immediately
concerned." "In this light the Lord Chief Justice of the
King's Bench is the principal coroner of the kingdom."
"He (the coroner) must have a sufficient landed estate to
.uphold the dignity of the position:" The "Mirror" Chap. I,
Sec. 2. Under the old common law he (the coroner) could
hold pleas of the crown:" The "Mirror" Chap. I, Sec. 3.
The right to hold pleas of the crown was taken from the
coroner by the Magna Charta, but was restored by the
statute de officio coronatis IV, Edward I. Among other things
the statute directs: "If any man be slain, and the culpable
man be found, he shall be amerced, all his goods and corn
within his grange, and if a freeman, his land shall be valued
and this escheat to the crown. Coroners shall take the
testimony of the witnesses in writing. If any coroner may
find any nuisance by which the death of a man happened, that
the township shall be amerced on such finding." Statute III,
Henry VII directs: :' That after the felony found the coroner
shall deliver therein inquisitions afore the justices of the hext
gaol delivery in the shire where the inquisition is taken, ...
and if any coroner do not in such manner certify his inquisi-
tion, he shall be fined one hundred shillings."
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Statute II and III, Phillip and Mary, Secs. 4 and 5: "Every
coroner upon inquisition before him found where any person
or persons. shall be indicted for murder or manslaughter com-
mitted, shall put in writing the effect of the evidence given by
the jury before him, being material," etc., "and return the
same to the Justices of Eyre."
Coke tells us that the substance of all the foregoing
statutes is to be found in the "Mirror," which was written
before the Conquest of England by the Normans, but was
edited and enlarged by a most discreet man by the name of
Home in the reign of Edward I; Preface to Coke's Reports,
9 th and i oth Vol.
Viner's "Abridgment of the Common Law," informs
us that the substance of all these statutes are to be found
in the commoh law writers, and was the eommon law in
the time of Glanville, Fleta Britton and Bracton. Haw-
kins Pleas of the Crown, and Bacon's Abridgment state that
the statute de oflio coronatis is wholly directory and in affirm-
ance of the common law, that.the coroner is not excused from
any of his duties, under the common law, which were incident
to his office before the efiactmenf of that statute: 2 Hawkins,
P. C., Chap. 9, Sec. 28;. Bacon's Abridgment-Coroner.
"The offices of the coroner," says Hale, "are judicial and
ministerial; and his office did not determine with the death of
the king. He could hold no inquest save in death. Under
the common law, he should take down the evidence of the
witnesses in writing, and return the same and the finding of
the jury to the Court of Eyre or Nisi Prits:" Hale's Pleas
of the Crown.
The Secretary of Edward VI and Elizabeth, Sir Thomas
Smith, in his history of the commonwealth tell us that: "The
impannelling of this inquest (the coroner's) and thie view of'
the body is commonly in the streets, in an open place and in
coroni populi."
His duties are described by COKE: "A coroner may and
ought to nquire of all the circumstances of the party's death,
and also of all things which occasioned it; and, therefore, it is
said, if it be found by his inquest that the person deceased, was.
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killed by a tall from a bridge into a river, and that the bridge
was out of repair by the default of the inhabitants of such
town, and those inhabitants are bound to repair it, the town-
ship shall be amerced:" Coke's Lyttleton, 277-83.
It was also his duty to admit the evidence on both sides.
Thus, we read: "The coroner must admit the evidence on
both sides of the question, and if not -admitted the inquest
will be quashed:" I Leving I 8o. "Coroners ought to hear
evidence and counsel on both sides:" 2 Siderfin Reports
9o-9I. "In the couit of King's Bench a rule was granted
for a coroner to show cause why a criminal information should
not be filed against him for refusing on taking an inquisition
super visum corporis to receive evidence on the part of the
party accused:" I Leach Crown Cases 43. "An inquest of
office by the coroner or escheator is public and every one has
a right to be heard; and it is conclusive against the world:"'
Starkie on Evidence.
"Inquest of office is of such notoriety that the law presumes
every one to be present; it is an inquest of office and is open to.
every one and is against the world.
Statutes 34, Edward III, C. 13, 36 Edward III, C. 13, i
Henry VIII, C. 8, 2 and 3, Edward VI, C. 8, 3 Term Reports,
707-12-21. See also Lord Kenyon's Opinion. Phillip on
Evidence citing : 3 Kible, 489 ; 6 Best and Cress, 6 11-27; 2
Burrows, 43; I Saunders, 362; 9 Dowling and Ryland, 247.
Also Boisliniere v. County Commissioners, 32 Mo. 375.
"Again, the coroner's inquest is a court of record of which
the coroner is judge :" 6 Best and Cress, 6 11-25.
II. THE CORONER'S INQUEST IS AN ACTION IN REM.
We will now consider whether a coroner's inquest is an action
in .personam or an action in rem. A coroner's inquest super
visum corporis is a proceeding on behalf of the- people to
determine how and by what means the person before whom
the coroner's jury was impannelled, came to his death. If
then, a judgment in rem (12 A. and E. Ency. p. 6 2), is: "A
judgment against some person or thing upon the status of the
person or the nature and condition of the thing, and is equally
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binding on all persons," will not an inquest by a coroner come
within this definition ? The more technical definition of a
-coroner's inquisitions, to wit: "A proceeding instituted on
behalf of the public for or against no one in particular, but
against or upon the thing or subject, whose' state or condition
is to be determined," agrees with the definition of an action in
rem as defined by the Supreme Court of Vermont (20 Ver-
mont 'Reports, 65), where the distinction between actions in
pfersonam and in rem is fully discussed. "A judgment in rei
I understand to be an adjudication pronounced upon the status
of some particular subject matter, by a tribunal having com-
petent authority for that purpose. It differs from a judgment
in personamin this, that the latter judgment is, in form as well
as substance, between the parties claiming the right; and that
it is so interpartes -appears by the record itself. It is binding
only upon the parties appearing to be such by the record, and
those claiming by them. A judgment in ren is founded on a
proceeding instituted not against the person as such, but
.against or upon'the subject matter itself, whose state or condi-
tion is to be determined. It is to determine the state or con-
dition of the thing itself- and the judgment is a solemn decla-
ration upon the status of the thing, and ipso facto renders what
it declares it to be, etc., no process issues against any one, but
all persons interested in determining the state or condition of
the instrument are constructively notified: " 20 Vermont
Reports, 65.
"Such inquests are of a public nature, and taken under
-competent authority, to ascertain a matter. of public interest,
are upon principles already announced admissable in evidence
against the world. They are analagous to adjudications inX
.rem, being made on behalf of the public; no one is properly
-a stranger to them; and all who can be affected bythem have
the power of contesting them:" I Starkie on Ev., 307-8, 7
Am. Ed.
That a coroner's inquest is in the nature of a proceeding in
rem is admitted by Starkie: 2 Starkie on Ev., 384-5, 7Am. Ed.
Saunders' Pleadings and Practice, page 219, admits that a
coroner's inquest is in the nature of a proceeding in rem.
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In Rex v. Killinghall, Chief Justice MANSFIELD informs us
that "an inquest of the coroner is likened to other inquests of
office:" I Burrows' Reports, 17.
The author of the celebrated Commentaries, Sir Wm.
Blackstone, held, in the case of Scott v'. Shearman, that "the
reason given in some books why this inquest (fugam ficit) is
not traversable like other inquests of office, is because of the
notoriety of. the coroner's inquest super visum corporis, at"
which the inhabitants of all the neighboring villages are bound
to be present :" 2 Win. Blackstone, Rep. 981.
All the .writers on evidence admit that an inquest of a
coroner super visum corporis "is, in the language of MANSFIELD,.
likened to other inquests of office," and it is admitted that an
inquest of office is a proceeding in rem. Such being the case
the Supreme Court of Tennessee has by analogy decided that
the testimony taken before a coroner's jury is evidence at a
subsequent trial, that the finding of such jury is evidence of
all facts found t-herein. The case of Pinson and Hawkins v.
Ivey, involved the point whether the testimony taken before
commissioners under the Act of 1819 is receivable as evidence
in a subsequent trial. The court held that: "Proceedings
in rein operating upon the property claimed without notice to,
adverse claimants, are had in prize courts in all civilized coun-
tries; the same course is pursued in the English Court of
Exchequer in cases of forfeitures for treasons, felonies, or a
violation of the revenue laws. Proceedings are had in the-
nature of proceedings in rem, and without notice, in courts
admitting wills to probate and granting administration, and
the expectancies of heirs and distributees, swept away when
the weakness of infancy, or residence in a foreign land should,
seemingly, protect them, because of the permanent political
cbnsideration, that the rights of property thus situated should be
speedily settled by legal ascertainment of them. All of which.
adjudications are dictated by public policy and necessity,,
regardless to some extent, of private rights."
"For similar reasons this course is pursued in the collection
of revenue, where the daily practice is to render up judgment
and dispose of property for taxes without notice to the owner.
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Where a proceeding has been had and an adjudication made,
in any of the courts above referred to, although in rem or in the
nature of a proceeding in rem and without notice; still, when-
-ever the judgment is drawn in question in another action
affecting the same property or subject matter, the only inquiry
that can be made in the second action is, had the court, ren-
dering the first judgment, jurisdiction over the subject matter
-and did it decide the same? If the first tribunal had jurisdic-
tion and has passed judgment, then such sentence or decree is
-conclusive and final upon all interested, and estops all other
.courts or tribunals before which is attempted to be litigated
the same matter. The facts foufid by the first tribufal, which
Were necessary to the formation of the sentence pronounced,
are also conclusive of the existence of such facts and can
never be the subject of inquiry upon a-subsequent investigation
in another tribunal, more than the sentence itself."
The same decision says that proceedifigs before justices of
the peace in certain cases and condemnation of commissioners
of excise, and that commission instituted by North Carolina
to issue military land warrants, and various other tribunals,
spiritual and otherwise, are conclusive, because they are pro-
.ceedings in the nature of a proceeding in rem: Pinson and
Hawkins v. Ivey, I Yerger, 349-50.
No one will question that the coroner has exclusive juris-
diction to hold an inquest over the remains-that his inquest
is to find out how the person was killed, and by whom-his
inquest is held on behalf of the public, and for .or against no
one.
III. ALL DEPOSITIONS OR TESTIMONY TAKEN BEFORE A COR-
ONER'S INQUISITION, WHETHER REDUCED TO WRITING OR NOT,
ARE GOOD EVIDENCE FOR OR AGAINST ANYONE, WHO MAY BE
THEREBY AFFECTED.
Upon these grounds the courts have admitted the testimony
taken before a coroner's jury, whether reduced to writing or
not, as good evidence in any cause of action, and have held
that the finding of the jury on a coroner's inquisition throws
the burden of proof in a civil case on the party alleging the
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-contrary. Such depositions, as taken before the coroner's
jury, are in the language of the Chief Justice of England, Sir
Thomas Jones, "good evidence of murther or anything else."
This rule of law is as old as the common law. It does not
depend upon statutory enactments for its origin. Testimony
taken before a jury impanelled by the coroner has been
received as evidence. "Whether the party to be effected was
present or not, or had never heard of the proceeding until
such testimony is produced in court," by every Chief Justice
of England from the time of Edward III. down to and includ-
ing the reign of Victoria. To show how well settled this rule
of law is, we will not confine ourselves to one or more deci-
sions from the courts of England, but will cite decisions and
dicta from each and every one of the decisions of the Chief
Justices aud Chancellors of England from the time of Lord HALE
down to and including the present Chief Justice. We will also
cite decisions and dicta from the courts of this country, from
New York, Vermont, Georgia, Arkansas, Alabama, Louisiana
and from North Carolina. Such evidence is receivable in
every one of the United States, unless this law has been re-
pealed. Of course, in most of the States in criminal cases it
has been repealed so far that the prisoner "must be 'met face to
face by his accusers."
The first decision we cite on the subject of the coroner's
inquisition was rendered in the reign of Edward III. This
was the Barclai case, in which the court held: "A creditor of
one Page, who was foundjedo de se by the coroner's inquisition,
traversed the finding, and the jury found that he was not a
felo de se: Barclai Case, East 45.
"If a man be drowned in a pit, the pit cannot be forfeited,
the coroner may charge the township to stop the pit, and
make entry thereof in his rolls; and. if it be not done before
the next gaol delivery, the township shall be amerded: " 8 E.
Carone, 416.
Inquests and the testimony of witnesses before a coroner's
jury were used as evidence in Keilway's Report, page 97 and
Aleyn's Report, 5I. These early decisions are quoted to
show that all the writers on evidence had not examined this
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rule of law when they stated that the reception of depositions:
and testimony taken before a coroner's inquest was under the:
Statutes of'i and 2, 2 and 3 Phillip and Mary. The in-
stances are innumerable where such testimony was received in-
the reigns of Elizabeth, James I., Charles 'I. and Cromwell.
One has only to have a "smattering " knowledge of English
history to discover that such evidence was more frequently
used than the testimony of witnesses, who met the accused
face to face. The first case we will cite after the restoration is
the case of Lord Morley before the House of Peers. History
states that Lord Morley was not present, when the coroner
held his inquest over the body 6f the victim. The House of'
Lords, upon finding certain facts, summoned "the Judges of'
all England, consisting of the Chief Justice, Sir John Key-
linge, Justices. Bridgeman, Atkin, Twisden,_ Tyrell, Turner,.
Browne, Wyndham, Archer, Raynsford, *Morton and Sir
Matthew Hale, to attend a trial before *the House of Peers..
They met and, upon the facts presented, inter alia, resolved
una voce:
"That in the case any of the witnesses who were examined.
were dead or unable to traveli and oath made thereof, that
then the examinatioil of such witnesses so dead or unable to
travel might be read, tle coroner first making. oath that such
examinations are the same, which he took upon oath without
alteration:" 7 State Trials, 42 1.
This is a solemn finding of all the judges of England upon
facts presented by the highest court of England-the Court
of Peers. This finding has been followed in every case where-
the question arose as to the admission 6f testimony taken-
before a coroner holdihg an inquest super visum corporis.
"A deposition taken before a coroner should be used in
evidence, if witnesses were dead or beyond the sea:, but not if
taken before a justice of the peace. For it is said that the
authority of a coroner super visun corporis is very great, and
in some cases cannot be traversed:" Chief Justice, Sir Thomas
Jones, Rep. 53.
"A deposition taken before a coroner can be received as
evidence:" Chief Justice, Sir John Kelynge, Rep. 55.
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During the twelfth and thirteenth year of the reign of
Charles II., that king by patent granted all escheats to their
former owners. This action was a scire fac-as, by the
administration of Tomes v. Etherington. Defendant pleaded
in bar the finding of the coroner's inquest over Tomes (Tomes
having committed suicide), the court sustained the plea to be
a proper plea and held, "An inquest is conclusive against all
parties, and is admissible as evidence:" I Saunder's Rep. 361.
"White, the Coroner of Westminster, offered the examina-
tion of witnesses, who- were sworn to be dead, and that they
were the same taken before him, viz, one Woodward and
Hancock, which per cmrium is good evidence of murther or
any other crime:" 2 Keble, 19.
"The coroner must admit evidence on both sides of the
question, and if not admitted, the inquest will be quashed.
Depositions before a coroner are admitted as evidence, the
witness being dead :" I Levinz, I 8o.
In the case of Rex et Regina v. Harrison, Mr. Darnell, the
Attorney-teneral of England, under William and Mary, said:
"My Lord, I desire that Andrew Boswell's examination before
Mr. John Browne, the Coroner of Lohdon, upon oath may be
read," which being proved by the coroner, the deposition was
directed to be read: 12 State Trials, 825.
"Attorney for defendant objected to the reading of an inqui-
sition of lunacy. The inquisition was admitted as pia
fade proof of such finding:" 2 Atkyns, 412.
In Leighton v. Leighton, an inquisition post mortem was
introduced in evidence where the inquest had found one had
been seized of a fee in the twenty-fifth year of Henry VIII.
The inquisition was admitted, though objected to, and was
competent evidence: Strange's Rep. 308.
Inquest of a coroner finding the deceased a lunatic, was
offered" in evidence against the plaintiff, who claimed as
executrix under the will of the suicide, for the purpose of
showing that'the deceased was incompetent to make a wil!;
evidence was objected to on the part of the executrix. Chief
Justice Parker was of opinion that the evidence should be
admitted: Strange's Rep. 68.
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"Inquisitions post mortem is good evidence-of any deed it
may find, in heac verba:" 2 Atkyns, 412.
"Inquisitions post mortem are evidence, of the facts con-
tained in them, and if the originals are lost, the recitals of
them in a proceeding on a petition of right in the coram rege
will be admitted: " 2 Lord Raymond, 1292.
In the case of Rex v. Eriswell, about the settlement of a
pauper under 12 and 13 Charles II., evidence was admitted
to prove what was said on an examination of the pauper by
the two committing justices of the peace, irr the absence of
.the inhabitants or representative of the Parish Iriswell. Held,
,under i and 2, and 2 and 3, Phillip and Mary, and 12"and 13
,Charles II.,-that this evidence was admissible, even if taken
before a justice of the peace, if the case is for the settlement
of a pauper. These acts were fully discussed by the four
judges. Justice Buller says, "This kind of evidence was
very similar to that of a- deposition of a' coroner, which has
been admitted to be good- evidence. Though the person
accused be not present when it is taken, nor ever heard of it
till the moment it is produced against him. The coroner is to
inquire into the cause arid circumstances of the death of the
deceased. Both inquiries are general, and no particular
persons are parties to them:" (i Levinz, 18o, Kelynge, 55).
Chief Justice Kenyon in the dissenting opinion said:
"That evidence should be given under sanction of an oath,
legally administered in judicial proceeding depending between
the parties effecting by it, or those who stand in privity of
estate or interest. And as to a judgment being binding,
though the party to be effected was not lpresent; I think it
will scarcely be found that it is so, unless in cases where the
party has had an opportunity of being present or was contu-
macious, neither of which was the case with the parish now to
be effected. The exceptions are founded- on the statutes of
W. & M. Besides, the examination before a coroner is an
inquisition of office; it is a transaction of notoriety to which
every person has a right of access:" 3 Term. Rep. 707-12-21.
Starkie refers to the case of King v. Paifie to uphold his
proposition that such testimony, as taken before a coroner's
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inquest in the -absence of the party accused, is not admissible
as evidence.
The counsel made the exception that depositions taken
before a mayor could not be used against the prisoner, but
.admitted that if the testimony had been before a justice of the
peace in the prisoner's presence, or before a coroner holding
an inquest super visum corporis, the evidence offered would be
admissible.
In the language of the counsel for defendant this case was
not like an information before a coroner or an examination
before justices of the peace." The court upheld the view of
counsel for defendant: 5 Modern Rep. 163.
An inquisition of lunacy is prima fade evidence of lunacy:
Failder v. Silk, 3 Campbell, 126.
In the case of Still v. Browne, it was decided that:
"Depositions of witnesses taken before the coroner on an
inquisition touching the death of a person killed by the colli-
sion is receivable in evidence in an action for damages- if the
witness is beyond the sea:" 9 Carrington & Payne, 245.
In the case of Prince of Wales Association v. Palmer, one
Palmer had been insured for £13,000 for the benefit of his
brother. The insured was an inebriate, Lnd after being insured
was murdered by the brother, for whose benefit the policy
had been taken out. Before this bill was filed, Palmer, for
whose benefit the policy was taken out, murdered some one
else, and had been convicted for the second murder and
hanged. Bill was filed in the Chancery Court of England by
the insurance company to compel the heir to surrender the
policy held by him. Inquest was read to prove fraud. The
finding of the coroner's inquest was the only evidence pro-
duced by the insurance company, a decree was entered com-
pelling the holder to surrender the policy, the court holding:
"The finding of a jury on a coroner's inquisition throws the
burden of proof, in a civil case, on the party alleging the
contrary:" 25 Beav'an's Rep. 6o5.
In Rex v. Gregory, the court held that an inquisition before
a coroner is receivable to prove the name of the deceased.
" The testimony should be reduced in writing, and when
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thus taken offi.cially on an inquest, it is, under the circumstances,
evidence against the party there or thereafter accused:" Io
Jurist, 38 77 Phillip on Ev., Io London Ed. 371.
"There is a class of cases where depositions taken ouit of
court and without the consent of the defendant may be used.
in evidence against him. "The court goes on to state that
the admission is under the statute of Phillip and Mary. That
statute does not provide that the testimony shall be admitted,
but the depositions are admitted on the ground that they have
been taken in the course of a judicial proceeding expressly
authorized by law:" People v. Restell, 2 Hill (N. Y.), 289-297..
In State v. Hooker and State v:Davis, the court held:
"What a deceased witness swore to at the preliminary
hearing before the committing magistrate is evidence at the-
trial in chief. Statutes of Phillip and Mary, unless repealed,
are in force in this country." The committing 1nagistrate was
a coroner. One of the accused was present at the time.' Both
were convicted: i7 Vermont, 658.
The court, after citing with approval the case of Lord
Morley, said:
"The testimony given at a coroner's inquest is admissible
as evidence at the trial in chief." The witness who had testi-
fied at the inquest of the" coroner was in Alabama. The pro-
secuting attorney had -made no effort to obtain witness, and
did not swear that the witness could not be obtained or was
dead, consequently the testimony. when offered was rejected
on these grounds alone: Williams v. State of Georgia, 19,
Ga. 4o2.
" Coroner's inquests and testimony taken liefove'a coroner's
jury are receivable as evidence if properly 'signed in Loui--
siana: " State of Louisiana v. Evans, 27 La. Ann. Rep. 297.
Testimony taken before a coroner's inquest is evidence in
Arkansas (so changed by statute that the testimony must be
taken in the presence of the accused): 2 Ark. Rep. 237--
240-49.
Davis v. State of Alabama brought up the question of the
interpretation of the statutes of Phillip and -Mary, for under
these the testimony was admitted. The error assigned in this.
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case by the counsel for the accused, Davis, was the admis-
sion of the testimony taken before the committing magistrate,
which testimony had not been reduced to writing as the sta-
tute directs. The court, after citing State v. Hooker, 17 Ver-
mont, 658; 3 Washington C.C. 244 and 2 Yerger, 58, with
approval, said: "These authorities, I think, sufficient to show
that the rule is the same in regard to. the admission of such
testimony, whether it be in k civil or a criminal case. It is
true the statute requires that the testimony of the witnesses
shall be reduced in writing by the committing magistrate, but
it does not, in express words, make such testimony evidence,
-if the witness should die, but we all know that testimony thus
reduced to writing is legitimate proof after the death of the
witness. How, I ask, does it become evidence? Not by
force of statute, for that does not make it evidence. It must,
therefore, become competent proof upon the general rules of
evidence; that is, the witness was duly sworn by competent
authority and an apportunity of cross-examination afforded.
It is these tests that render the testimony of the deceased wit-
ness competent proof, and not that it was reduced to writing.
If, therefore, the committing magistrate shall fail or neglect to
do his duty in reducing the evidence taken before him to writ-
ing, this will not take from the testimony of the deceased wit-
ness either of the tests requisite for its admissibility as proof.
Nor was it the design of the act to alter the rules of evidence in
reference to such testimony. It was only intended to preserve
the evidence, but not to alter the law in regard to its admissi-
ility. True, if the magistrate had not omitted to do his duty,
and had taken down in writing the testimony of the deceased
witness, this examination would have been the best evidence
of what the witness swore, but as he failed to do it, this omis-
sion does not destroy the evidence of the deceased witness as
competent proof, if it can be recollected and accurately stated
upon another trial: " Davis v. State of Ala., 357.
In People v. White, the, court held, "Testimony of wit-
nesses before a coroner's jury may be received as evidence:"
22 Wendell (N. Y.), 17.
"The depositions taken before trustees for relief against
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.absent debtors, on the same principle as coroner's inquisition,.
even though ex parte is admissable as evidence:" 7 Johnson
(N. Y), 373.
Jackson 'ex dern Potter and Calvin v. Bailey, was an actiom
.of ejectment for the recovery of land in the township of Mar-
,cellus, in Onandago County. The- land was granted to-
-Ephraim Blowers. The lessors of the plaintiff claimed under a
.4eed by Blowers to Van Rensellaers. Defendant contended
.that Blowers was an infant when the deed was executed. To
:prove this he called one Matthews, one of the commigsioners
appointed under the Acts of the Legislatureentitled: "AnAct to
settle disputes concerning title to -land in the County of*
Onandago." To testify what Charles and Jane Blowers,.
uncle and aunt to Ephraim Blowers, and who were dead, had
sworn-to before the commissioners at the time the title to the.
lot was litigated before them by the parties to this cause. The-
,court -held that such testimony was admissable as evidence,.
and said: "But even the want of an opportunity for cross-
examination, has not been deemed sufficient to exclude this.
kind of evidence. For it has been ruled, that if witnesses who.
were examined on coroner's inquest be dead, or beyond the
sea, their deposition may be read; for the coroner is an officer
on behalf of the public to make inquiry about the matter
within his jurisdiction-; and therefore the law will presume the
-depositions before him to be fairly and impartially taken: " -2:
Johnson, (N. Y.) I 17-20.
"The testimony of a person examined as a witness before a.
coroner's jury such person not being at the time under arrest
or charged with crime, may be given in evidence against him
on his subsequent trial for the alleged murder of the deceased:"
2 Am. Law Reg. O. S. I Parker, 406 or 595.
"The Statutes of 4 Edward I., regulating the power and
.duties of coroners is in force in Pennsylvania:" I W. N. C..
372.
In State v. Broughton, the court held their revised Statutes
*C. 35 on' Coroner is taken from the Statutes of Phillip and
Mary: 3 Iredell (N. C), 96, ioI.
"In speaking of the duty and authority of the coroner,.
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Buller affirms: "It is a general rule that depositions taken in
a court not of record shall not be allowed in evidence else-
where; yet if the witnesses on a coroner's inquest be dead, or
beyond the sea, their depositions may be read; for the coroner
is an officer appointed on behalf of the public to make inquiry
about the matters within his jurisdiction; and therefore the law
will. presume the depositions before him to be fairly and
impartially taken, and by the Statutes of 'Phillip and Mary this.
power was given to the justices of the peace:" Buller's Nisi
Prius, 242.
"Judgment, decree or verdict, is allowed to operate as
evidence against strangers to the original suit, when the pro-
ceeding is, as it is technically called in ren:" I Starkie on Ev.
227-8.
"Inquests of office, depositions and evidence of a judicial
proceeding. Such inquests as are of a public nature and taken
under competent authority to ascertain a matter of public
interest, are under principles already announced, admissable in
evidence agaifist the world. They are analagous to an adjudi-
cation in rem, being made on behalf of the public; no one is
properly a stranger to them; and any one who can be effected
by them have the power of contesting them:" 7 Am. Ed., I
Starkie on Ev. 307-8.
Phillip on Evidence says, "There are, however, authorities,
which hold that depositions taken at an inquest before a coroner,
and even if taken in the absence of the accused, may be admitted
on the ground that the coroner is a public officer: John Kelynge's
Rep. 55, Sir Thomas Jones' Rep. 53 ; I Levinz, 18o, and 12
Howard St. Rep. 852, etc. It is unquestionably regular for the
coroner to take depositions in the absence of the party who
may be afterwards charged with the murder on the inquest as
regular, as it is for a justice to take depositions in the presence
of the prisoner:" 2 Phillip on Ev., ioth Am. Ed. 239-40,224;
3 Phillip on Ev. 318 Note.
In Rex v. Smith,'the court decided that depositions taken in
the presence of the prisoner were "regular." The counsel for
Smith contended that the Statutes of Phillip and Mary were
not followed, as all the testimony was not taken in the presence
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of the accused. The testimony was read over to the accused
by the justice of the peace. The testimony was admitted as
evidence: 2 Starkie Rep. 208.
"The testimony taken before a coroner's inquest is admiss-
able as evidence: " Peake on Ev. 6I.
"Depositions of witnesses taken before the coroner on an
inquiry touching the death of a person killed by the collision
is receivable in evidence in an action for damages, 'if the
witness be beyond the sea:" Greenleaf on Ev. 553, Note.
By the i and 2"Phillip and Mary, C. 13, § 15, the c6toner is
required to take the depositions of witnesses on an inquisition
of death and certify it, together ;with the proceedings, to the
Judge at the Assizes. Under this provision the coroner ought
to take evidence in favor of the party accused, as well as against
him, for the inquiry is not so much like the definition of a grand
jury or a bill of indictment, as an inquest of office to ascertain
how the deceased came to receive those injuries which proved
mortal. The examination thus taken will be sufficient evidence
in case the witnesses are dead, unable to travel, beyond the
sea, or kept out of the way by the contrivance of the party to
whom their testimony is adverse. And it seems they differ
from those taken before justices in this respect, that they are
admissible, though taken in the absence of the prisoner;
because the coroner. is an officer on behalf of the public,
and will be presumed to have acted properly in all matters
within his jurisdiction: i Chitty's Criminal Law, 587.
This position that a coroner's inquest is in the nature
of a proceeding in rem is upheld by Saunders' Pleadings and
Practice, 219.
"The testimony and depositions of witnesses taken before a
coroner or before the committing magistrate is evidence at the
trial in chief:" i Wharton on Ev., § 177, 642-7, 8.12, 2d Ed.
"In this respect there is a striking difference between depo-
sitions before a magistrate and before a coroner; for not only
has it been settled, that if any witnesses who have been
examined before the coroner are dead or unable to travel, or
kept out of the way by the means and contrivance of the
prisoner, their depositions, may be read on the trial of the
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prisoner, but the prevailing opinion seems to be that they are
equally admissible, through the prisoner may have been absent at
the time of taking the inquisition. The reasons given for this
distinction usually are that the examination before the coroner
is a transaction of notoriety to which every one has right of
access; and that the coroner is an officer appointed on behalf
of the public to make inquiry about the matter within his
jurisdiction; and, therefore, the law will presume the deposi-
tions taken before him to be duly and impartially taken:" 2
Russell on Crimes, 892.
Taylor (Evidence, § 499) admits that these depositions have
been and are used in the subsequent trial.
We will next consider whether these depositions should be
reduced to writing to make them evidence. The word deposi-
tion as used in the old reports, and the word testimony are
synonymous. Peters' Digest of the Common Law gives this
definition of a deposition: "In legal language a deposition is
evidence giv6n by a witness under interrogatories oral or
written, and usually written down by an official person."
Depositions of a former witness before a coroner's inquest
can be proven by a coroner or clerk, according to Lord Hale,
or now by any person present at the taking who heard the
testimony of deceased witness:" I Phillip on Ev. 415, ioth
Am. Ed.
"As to the person by whom the viva voce testimony may be
proved, the American cases agree with the English, that this
may be done by any one who heard the testimony, the judge,
counsel, jury or bystander, provided he will, on oath, under-
'take to repeat it in such detail as the practice of the courts
may require :" Phillip on Ev., citing authorities.
When this country was settled, preliminary examinations
'before magistrates and coroners were, in England, regulated
by two statutes which were received as common law in Penn-
sylvania, in Maryland, and probably in the other states
generally. They are'i and 2 P. & M. C. 13, §§ 4 and 5, and
2 and 3 P. & M. C. IO; I Bishop on Criminal Proceedure,
1198.
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IV. SOME PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS.
We will now inquire whether the reason that justified the-
revival of this old Anglo-Saxon law under Edward I., by the-
enactment of the statute de offieio coronatis, after having slept
for two hundred years, would be sufficient to enforce this rule
of the old common law. "The reason of the law," as Lord
Coke said, "is the light of the law." In reading of the early
Plantagenet reigns we notice that justice was a mockery, and
at times the judges were mistreated. This was caused by the-
lawlessness of the barons. These ancient highway robbers
and sneak thieves would issjme from their castles, burning,
robbing and committing every crime in the decalogue. To
these crimes was always added murder. The coroner of the
county would hold an inquest upon the slain. Before this
inquest the vitnesses would testify. The eoroner not obey-
ling the common-law rule-to return the inquest and the testi-
mony to the Court of Eyre on the next circuit-the case
being called these criminals would appear and demand justice.
The witnesses not appearing and the judges neglecting to
enforce this ancient common rule of law concerning testimony
taken before a coroner's jury, the accused would be acquitted.
Before these barons, however, would demand justice they took
"good care " to "interview" the witnesses to know whether
they would be present at the trial. After such "interview "
the witnesses would be confined in the dungeons of their cas-
tles, then with what safety they could demand to meet their
accusers face to face !! How horrible the times were can be
realized by reading the Chronicles of Ienry of Monmouth.
In Ivanhoe we read of all these crimes, and when the Castle
of Forquilstone was stormed how the witnesses of the crimes
of Front De Bceuf almost swarmed from the dungeons.
Scott's graphic description of the crimes committed by Front
De Boeuf, and how he had escaped punishment clearly de-
monstrated the necessity of such a law as that enacted by
IV, Edward I. The enactment of this law and its rigid en-
forcement in subsequent reigns demonstrates the necessity for
it. We never hear after the enactment of de 'Ffcio c ronatis
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of witnesses being seized. The barons became stronger than
ever-the kings weaker-yet justice did not miscarry by the
seizure of witnesses by the barons for the next two hundred
and ten years. Before the enactment of this statute the wisest
and strongest kings of England had been unable to enforce
the law, and after its enactment the weakest king could pre-
serve better order than the strongest had before. This sta-
tute pi evented the miscarriage of justice, ahd it was a protec-
tion-to the witnesses; for the accused would prefer to meet
the witnesses face to face to being tried on the depositions of
witnesses whom they had no opportunity to cross-examine.
Witnesses, who were compelled to testify, were under a greater
protection than any statute could secure; the defendant as
well as the State were solicitous by their welfare. Does any
reason exist now for the enforcement of this law? Are the
circumstances such that its enforcement is necessary ? Are
there any barons of modern times, who can kill, and for the
lack of witnesses appearing against them at the trial, go free ?
We think that there is reason and necessity for the enforce-
ment of this law. Instead of barons of flesh, who .had souls
and were slightly amenable to the good influences of the
priests of Christ, we have hundred and thousands of corpora-
tions, declared by the law to be souless-to make money is
their sole object, and human labor is but a chattel to be
bought and sold as it increases or decreases in value. The
laborer is served with notice to appear before a coroner's in-
quest. He must, under penalty, give all the facts known by
him to the jury, and if he dares to testify to facts prejudicial
to the interest of the corporation before a coroner's jury, he
is at once told to draw his pay and leave. This law not now
being enforced a premium is given for perjury. The witness
must testify in the interest of his employers, or he is deprived
of the chance to earn his bread. Often are the interests of
others involved. Nothing is so merciless as money when
money is endangered. -More merciless than the barons of old,.
they involve in their vengeance, not only the poor witness,
but his family; he sees their bread taken from them, sees
them starve, because he has been made to testify that through
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their negligence an animal has been killed. He and his must
suffer, because he has been compelled by the law to testify to
facts detrimental to the corporation, and for fear it would suf-
fer the loss of a few paltry dollars. Placed upon a railroad's
black list a man can suffer and starve until he is as gruesome
as the figure that impersonates famine before he can, under
his right name, obtain work at his occupation.
"There is no wrong without its remedy," and, yet cases fre-
quently arise illustrating clearly the necessity for the enforce-
ment of this rule of law making all facts by a coioner's jury
primafacie evidence of all facts foufid, and receiving all testimony
taken before them as good evidence for or against any one,
who may be thereby affected, for without this rule of law,
-wrongs are committed by the thousands without any adequate
remedy in the law.
For example:
A switchman, whilst switching in a railroad yard was
run over by an engine and killed, leaving an aged and infirm
father. At the inquest held over his remains his " mate" testi-
fied that the engine used was an old road engine which had
a defective footboard, and that the engine was backing at the
time of the accident; that upon throwing the switch, the switch-
man jumped upon the footboard of the engine and grabbed the
brake with his hands; the footboard becoming detached from
the engine, lie held on with his hands at least a minute before
falling; that the witness gave the usual signals and hallooed
but the engineer and fireman did not heed them. Had the
engineer and fireman been paying attention, and had they
heeded his calls and signals the engine could have been
stopped before the switchman fell; the engineer was looking in
the opposite direction to that in which the engine was going,
-and the fireman was flirting with some girls on the opposite
side of the street.
This testimony was corroborated by other witnesses. Upon
these facts the coroner's jury returned a verdict censuring the
raihoad for gross carelessness and binding the engineer and
fireman over to the criminal court. The father of-the deceased
sued the railroad company for damages. Before the verdict of
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the coroner's jury was rendered the witnesses were discharged
by the railroad. The principal witness (the "mate" of
deceased) not being able to secure employment at the place of
the accident was traced from place toplace in search of work.
until all trace of him was lost. Thus a double wrong had been
committed and suffering inflicted on both the living and the
dead. An employee of the road while acting in the discharge
of his duty, guiltless of any carelessness, was without warning,
and without fault subjected to a death horrible in the extreme,-
an occurrence so frequent on the great railroads of this
country that it is considered hardly sufficient to merit a passing
comment in the columns of the press. Had the censurable
conduct of the railroad stopped here, it would have been
passed without comment or rebuke, the courts of the country
being now as in the days of King Edward relied on in confi-
dence to deny justice to no man. But an insult to the court
is added to the injury of the dead man, and the only wit-
nesses who could prove the facts which would compel a
pecuniary compensation for the wrongful act were dis-
charged by the wrong doer and compelled by want of work to
seek employment in distant States, where they too perhaps fell
victims to the carelessness of a railroad, and where probably again
the witnesses to the tragedy were in like manner compelled to go
to distant States. Such may be the case of every man who
testifies to facts prejucial to the interest of a railroad. If such
testimony is not admissable in a subsequent suit, why should
a railroad employee be compelled to place himself in this posi-
tion? If a coroner's inquest is a "mere form" is it not unjust
to compel one who must toil for his daily bread to lose all
chances of employment. If the position taken in this article is
the law would it not compel the railroads to be as solicitous.
for the witnesses' appearance at the trial as the accused were
when the law was enforced. Would they not desire to meet
the witnesses "face to face?" Would it not secure to their
employees safety and employment, and make laborers less
liable to shirk their duty to their fellow-men? It would make.
every corporation wish to meet the witnesses face to face in a
court of justice, to have the privilege of cross-examination
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and to have a jury pass upon the credibility of such witnesses.
Wonderful it would be, if during a period of six hundred
years, embracing all the reports of the common law, we could
not find a few opinions to the contrary. In a late case in Illinois
depositions taken by a coroner were excluded. Although
admitting that depositions could be used under the English
Statutes (Phillip and Mary), yet there being "no implication
for its use" in their statute this testimony was excluded. As
the statutes of de offiio coronatis and Phillip and Mary have
not been repealed and in no manner whatsoever cbnflict with
their statute on coroner, (Revised Statutes of Illinois, 1885,
Hurd), to arrive at its decisiot, the court must have repealed
the above-mentioned statutes by im plication. Section 14, page
294 of Revised Statutes of Illinois, directs the jury in almost
the identical words of the early English statutes to find out
all the facts concerning how the deceasid came to receive
those injuries which proved mortal: "It shall be the duty of
the jurors, as aforesaid, to inquire how, in what manner and
by whom or what the said body came to its death, and of all
otherfacts of and concerning the same, together with all mater-
ial circumstances in any wise related to or connected with
said death and make up and sign a verdict, and deliver the
same to the coroner." A recital of the opinion will, with all
due respect to the court so deciding, show its fallacy.
"'The provision of our statute simply is, "which testimony
(before coroners) shall be filed with said coroner in his office
and carefully preserved, there being no implication, as in the
English statute, that the inquisition is for use in court. The
cases, in which such depositions have be.n received, are mostly
criminal cases, but they have been received in a civil case
(Sill v. Brown, 9 C. & P. 6oi). The plaintiff was not a party
to the proceedings before the coroner, was not present, had no
opportunity for the cross-examination of the witness and any
question of negligence-the vital question here-was not the
very matter of inquiry before the coroner. The legitimate
object of the inquest would have been fulfilled in finding
simply that death was caused by his being run over by a rail-
road train, without inquiring whether it was through any
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one's or whose negligence. We are of opinion was rightly
-excluded."
Pittsburgh, Cincinnati & St. Louis Railway Company v.
,James McGrath Adams, 115 Illinois Rep. 175-6.
The next opinion cited is simply judicial legislation over-
-iding former decisions of the New York Court, and in terms
repealing the statute of Phillip and Mary, .without ever giving
a reason for so doing. Our inference from the language of
the court is that, had they ever heard of an inquision they
did not fully comprehend its nature and effect. In M. Cook
as administrator of John Cook, deceased, v. The New
York Central Railroad Company, the court held, "The testi-
mony of the witness, John Brennan, before the coroner's in-
-quest, was properly excluded, the inquest was no action or
judicial proceeding beween the parties in any sense:" 5 Lan-
sing (N. Y.), 4o6.
In State v. Campbell, 2 Richardson, 12., the court held that
depositions before a coroner were not admissible on the ground
that-" they are ex-Parte"-" there was no cross-examination-
by the prisoner's counsel; " cannot see a word in either act, to
justify any alteration in the established rule of ezvidence;" "that
it cannot escape observation that; at most, their resolves were
no more than respectable obiter dicta, and made before the
meeting of the Peers who tried Lord Morley:" I Richardson
(S. C.), 124.
In conclusion we will cite the dissenting opinion of Justice
O'Neill in the last-mentioned case: "Instead of being ques-
tioned, until Rassell, Starkie and Roscoe wrote, no one
dreamed of doubting them. That great and good man, Sir
Matthew Hale, in his Pleas of the Crown, 2nd Vol., 284, re-
cognizes the rule in its broadest terms." Judge Buller, in his
trials at Nisi Prius," 292, says: "If the witnesses examined on
a coroner's inquest be dead or beyond the sea, their deposi-
tions may be read ; for the coroner is an officer appointed on
behalf of the public to make inquiry about the matter within
his jurisdiction." In Leach's Crown Cases, 14 Webster's Case
will be found, "in which the deposition of an accomplice
taken before Lord Chief Justice Lee was allowed to be read
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cn proof of his death." In the case of King v. Eriswell, 3 T..
R. 763, it is stated by BULLER, J., that the examination of a
pauper, under 13 and 14 Cor. II., was very similar to the
case of depositions before a coroner, which has long been
settled to be good evidence, thmgh the person accused be not'
present when it is taken nor never heard of it till the moment
it is produced against him. Lord Kenyon, who differed from
Buller on the point before them, admitted the rule in criminal
cases as to depositions before the coroner. For he said:
"These exceptions alluded to, meaning depositions taken
before magistrates and coroners are founded on the statutes of
Phillip and Mary, and that they go no further, is abundantly
proved. Besides, the examination before the coroner is an.
inquest of office, it is a transaction of notoriety to which every
person has access. After such an array of authorities I con-
fess I shoult as little think of questioning the rule, as I
would the first rule of evidence. It i, true, Judge Johnson
did express a doubt about the admissibility of such evidence,
but the point was not before him, and he merely acquiesced
in the reasonableness of Starkie's doubt. I attach no coise-
quence to the presence of the prisoner or on hfs right of
cross-examination. Neither of them are of any intrinsic con-
sequence to truth; and then when it is remembered that this.
is an inquest of. office, and that the testimony is only resorted
to where God has put out of the power of the State or the
accused to have the benefit of a first examination of the wit-
nesses, there can be no reason to complain of its admissibility:
2 Richardson, S. C., 134-5.
